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INTRODUCTION 
High system reliability is a prime re-
quirement for an effective space program. 
This requirement is underscored by the 
high cost of the launch vehicles and 
spacecraft. Early estimates indicate the 
average cost per pound of material in 
orbit; results in an investment of about 
$67,J00. 11 Furthermore, since launch 
opportunity for certain space studies is 
depe~dent upon interplanetary relation-
ships, success on the first launch 
attempt is necessary in order to effect 
timely acquisition of needed space data. 
Thus, assurance of success must be en-
hanced by every possible means. One of 
the most effective technigues to enhance 
11 NASA TN D-134Q, "Scientific Satellites 
and the Space EnVironment", J.C.New,GSFC 
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reliability of our space systems has been 
the application of laboratory tests which 
simulate, in so far as practical, the many 
environmental conditions actually encount-
ered by the spacecraft. Environmental 
tests must be applied in a well defined 
test program which gives proper attention 
to the test levels, test duration, se-
quence of application, and appropriate 
evaluation of results. The specifications 
for such tests involve consideration of 
ground handling, launch, injection and 
orbital environs. At the start of the 
space program, evaluation experience with 
space hardware was limited to that obtain-
ed from research sounding rockets, weapons 
systems, and missile testing. While this 
experience provided a foundation for en-
vironmental specifications covering 
ground handling and launch, little founda-
tion was available for the orbital space 
environs. Facility limitations prevented 
duplication of the effects of the more 
exotic of the space environs (such as 
micrometeorites and energetic particles) 
on a complete satellite. These environ-
ments were more properly evaluated on a 
material or subsystem basiS. For the 
complete spacecraft thermal-vacuum tests 
were used to evaluate the performance 
under simulated space conditions. These 
tests gave information on the performance 
at expected orbital temperature extremes, 
the adequacy of the thermal design, and 
on thel,'failure rate versus time. 
A ,number of scientific earth satellites 
have been tested, and launched by the 
Goddard Space Flight Center" A review 
of the specifications, laboratory test 
results and orbital performance of the 
spacecraft should be profitable in deter-
mining the adequacy of some aspects of the 
specifications used. This report will be 
restricted to the Thermal-Vacuum test 
experience and analysis related to three 
Scientific Satellite projects. It will 
di~cuss the choice of parameters, the 
ph110sophy used, and the experience 
gained by the Test and Evaluation Division 
of the Goddard Space Flight Center. 
TEST PHILOSOPHY 
The test philosophy 11 employed has 
been to use environmental tests to gain 
information from which the suitability 
of a spacecraft for flight can be assessed. 
To this end, the systems test program 
for a satellite has six goals: . 
I; Verification that novel or un-
proven deSigns meet performance 
requirements and have a satis-
factory life expectancy. 
11 The Role of Environmental Testing in 
Satellite Reliability. May,1962, J.H. 
Boeckel, GSFC No. X-320-62-4i. 
2. Verification that particular samples 
of previously employed hardware are 
suitable in a new application. 
Elimination of defects in design, 
material or workmanship (L.e. 
finding the weak links in the 
chain) • 
4. Discovery of unexpected inter-
actions between sub-assemblies 
when the system is exposed to 
environmental stress. 
5. Training of personnel who will be 
responsible for the satellite at 
the launching site and those who 
will be responsible for data re-
duction and analysis. 
6. Generation of information which 
will serve as a guide in making 
new deSigns and in assessing their 
reliability. 
The degree to which these goals may be 
attained is strongly conditioned by the 
fact that in typical programs, only one 
prototype and two flight spacecraft are 
available for test. 
In attempting to reach the goals, des-
pite the limitations, one must formulate 
a model of the failure pattern which we 
might expect to encounter and base the 
test philosophy on this concept. Our 
somewhat limited experience suggests that 
satellite failures fall into four cate-
gories: 
1. Early failures caused by a major 
design weakness. 
2. Early failures resulting from de-
fects in material or workmanship. 
3. Random failures whose frequency of 
occurrence is a function of design 
and quality control. 
4. Wear-out failures. 
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Figure 1 illustrates tr;is model 
pattern. If the failure pattern is appli-
cable, progressive improvement in the de-
pendability of the system should occur 
during the test program. As the "weak 
links" in the SUbsystem chain are found 
and strengthened, the curve should 
approach the random failure rate level. 
The length of time necessary to reach 
this level is vital and elusive. Con-
sistent with the locating of weaknesses 
is the practice of providing a margin of 
safety over expected extremes of opera-
tion. To this point, prototype space-
craft are subjected to more severe 
environmental stress than flight models. 
In the thermal-vacuum tests, prototype 
model spacecraft are subjected to tempera-
ture extremes lDOC in excess of those pre-
dicted for orbit. Flight models are 
subjected to thermal-vacuum tests at 
.predicted orbital temperature·extremes. 
For this philosophy to be workable, 
an extensive program of part qualifica-
tion on the basis of tests or, previous 
successful utilization must be presupposed. 
Similarly, sub-assembly testing under 
environments more severe than those ex-
pected in actual use is a near necessity. 
(It should be noted that the difficulty 
of conducting adequate sub-assembly tests 
of complicated new devices on the time 
scale of the typical satellite develop-
ment program is frequently overwhelming. 
If not accomplished, however, a risk is 
incurred that the system test may be un-
necessarily interrupted or extended by 
the su1?-assembly failure). 
SPACECRAFT TESTED 
The data developed in this report is 
based upon the experience gained in test-
ing three spacecraft. These were: (a) 
Explorer X, the Interplanetary 'Probe 
(one prototype and three flight models), 
(b) Explorer XII, The Energetic Parti-' 
cles Satellite (one prototype and two 
flight units), and (c) Ariel I, the 
International Ionosphere Satellite (one 
prototype and two flight ,units). Fig-
ures 2, 3, and 4 show these spacecraft. 
o ~ ~~ ~mlr~0 / tN~ 
Figure 2. Explorer X, the Interplanetary 
Probe 
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Figure 3. Explorer XII, the Energetic 
Particles Satellite. 
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Figure 4. Ariel I, the International 
Ionosphere Satellite 
DESCRIPTION OF TESTS CONDUCTED 
, The tests conducted were accomplished 
in thermal-vacuum chambers5having a vacuum capability of IxIO- mm Hg or 
better. The thermal control in most 
cases was accomplished by control of the ' 
chamber walls. Additional thermal grad-
ient tests were conducted using tungsten 
lamps to control local temperatures of a 
s(!ctor of' the spacecraft while the chamber 
was used to control the temperature of 
~ther portions of the spacecraft (at a 
aifferent temperature). These tests were 
conducted to determine if any weaknesses 
existed when high thermal gradients 
existed within the spacecraft correspond-
ing to a 'particular orientation of the 
spacecraft with respect to the sun. 
, ' 
I," 
, :, 
" 
~ , 
" 
, ~'. 
" 
''. 
:, 
-, 
,-
The temperature capabilities of the 
chambers were -65°C to +IOOoC. Solar 
simUlation was ~ot available for any of 
,. ,~I 
the tests reported herein. The three , 
types of tests used were: cold soak test, " 
hot soak test, and temperature gradient, ' 
test. Table 1 shows the scheduled test " 
duration fpr each spacecraft. 
. , 
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Grad-
Hot Cold ient Total 
Explorer X 
Prototype 1.25* 1.25* ' 
--
2.5 
Fliaht Units 1 1 2 
Explorer XII 
Prototype 2 2 4 8 
Fliaht Units 
-
I 4 5 
Ariel 1 
Prototype 3 2 2 7 
Fliaht Units 3 2 
-
5 
* Half of battery life 
Table 1. Scheduled Test Times. (Days) 
LABORATORY TEST RESULTS 
The data presented in this report have 
been arranged to examine essentially two 
aspects of failures encountered in the 
conduct of the thermal-vacuum tests. 
These two are: (1) Effects of high ver-
sus low temperature, and (2) The failure 
rate for both the. high and low temperature 
levels. A word of explanation is necess-
ary on what constituted a failure. A 
severe criterion was used, that is, any 
malfunction which caused sub-standard 
performance or loss of data was classed 
as' a failure •. This, of. co~rse, is not 
synonymous with satellite or even experi-
ment failure. 
,-
The data is organized in accordance 
with the following criteria: - Examina-
tion of the test results must be made 
with these rules in mind. 
l',,'-"Time to failure is satellite (or 
subsystem) operating,time under 
vacuum (conditioning time under 
vacuum was not counted). 
2. Time to failure for any sub-
system which did not have a 
continuous duty cycle was the , 
operating time of that subsystem. 
3. Time to failure for any hot test 
does not iqclude any time under 
the cold test environment. Simi-
, " 
- larly, for the time to failure 
classified as a cold test failure. 
4. 'Time to failure for any SUb-system 
-,'which was retested was the total 
operating 'time of the sub-system 
,except for the case where:the 
same component failed. 
I ' 
5. :Failures which occurred during 
chamber evacuation on retests were 
,counted as early failures. (For 
example, if a corona type of fail-
ure occurred on a retest of the 
. ,spacecraft, the time to failure 
'- did ,not include the duration of 
the original test). 
,6~ . The operating time of the space-
craft in the thermal gradient type 
~-",·t~---________ ''''i ... '.. 14 ____ -.. ____ '"".,.. .. ,..., .... , _________________________ _ 
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of test is included in the failure 
rate curves. The failures are 
identified as hot or cold, depend-
ing upon conditions at time of 
failure. 
Spacecraft Type 0 Test Totals Hot Cold 
Prototype 
Explorer X 4 0 
Explorer XII 6 24 4 15 39 
'Ariel I 14 11 
Flight Units 
Explorer X 2 6 
Explorer XII 0 5 11 28 33 
Ariel I 3 11 
Totals * 29 43 72 
* 
* Totals do not lnclude set-up, corona, 
or operator failures. 
Table 2. Summary of Failures in Thermal-
Vacuum Tests. 
******* 
TYPE TEST MECH. COM- DE- THER- TOTALS 
SYSTEM 11 PO- SIGN MAL 
NENT 11 11 
Proto- cold 2 7 3 3 15 
t_vpe hot 6 9 2 7 24 
Flight cold 4 10 9 5 28 
hot 0 1 2 2 5 
TOTAL cold 6 17 12 8 43 
hot 6 10 4 9 29 
Grand 
Total 12 27 16 17 72 
11 Does not lnclude set-up, corona or 
operator failures. 
11 Mechanical failures include cold 
solder joints, connectors, sheared 
screws, and broken leads. 
11 Design failures include underrated 
components and unbalanced circuits. 
11 Thermal failures include inadequate 
heat sinks, poor thermal contacts, 
and temperature sensitivity. 
Table 3. Summary of Types of Failures 11 
******* 
SPACE- ITEM' EXPOSURE IY DEFECT 
CRAFT lrIME(DAYS 
Ariel I Solar C 4 R : Circuit would 
(Flight array not operate 
Unit) protec-
tive 
circuit 
Ariel I Electrone 6 R Temperature 
(Proto- Density Sensitive 
type) Solar ~ 7 N 1 Megacycle Array sine wave pre-
Shunt sent when cir-
Reaulato cui t Qperatin,q 
Optical C 9 N Voltage spikes 
Aspect 
Tape C 11 R T.R. did not 
Recorder playback on 
command-
I 
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continued 
SPACE- ITEM EXPOSURE Y DEFECT 
CRAFT TIMB(DAYS 
Ariel I Tape H 5 R Excessive (Proto- Recorder current for 
type) tape recorder 
con- Recycle H 6 N Spacecraft 
tinued Timer did not turn 
on after 
undervoltage 
test. 
11 Long term defined as 4 days or greater. 
11 Kind of Failure: N= New Failure; R= 
Repeat Failure. C-Cold test: H= Hot test 
Table 4. Table of Long Term 1IFailures. 
******* 
SPACE- HIGH LOW SOLAR ASPECT 
CRAFT TEMP. TEMP. 
Explorer X 
Proto- +35°C ooC This type of test 
type & & did not apply 
43°C* 25°C* 
Flight +20oC ooc 
Units & & 
1 & 2 400C* 300C* 
*Stabilized temp-
erature of Bias 
Sphere 
Explorer X I 450 135° 
Proto- +35°C -10°C +45 0C(1) +35°C(2) 
type _20oC(2} -200C(4) 
Flight See -10°C +32°C(3) +35°C(2) 
Units 450 _200C(2) _100C(4) 
1 & 2 
.t ....... :·· 
Aspect 
(1) Top cover 
(2) Transmitter 
(3) Battery 
(4) Maqnetometer 
Ariel I 300 1350 
Proto- n 55°C _10°C +300C(4),+100C(4) 
type (2 47°C -10°C 
(3 42°C -15°c 
Flight 37°C -SoC This type test not 
Units c~mducted 
1 & 2 
(1) Test No. 1 
(2) Test No. 2 
(3) Test No. 3 
(4) UCL Electronics 
Stack 2 
Table 5. Sununary of Thermal-Vacuum Test 
Parameters for Three Spacecraft 
Table 2 summarizes the failures for both 
prototype and flight unit spacecraft with, 
respect to the thermal environment. Table 
3 is the same information, but segregated 
according to the type of failure. Table-4 
is additional detail on failures which' 
occurred after 4 days of testing. Table 
5 lists the temperature levels which were 
used for the testing of the three space-
craft. 
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Figure 5. 
TIME (DATSI 
FLIGHT U.JT 
-NOT 
---COLD 
Summary of Spacecraft Failures 
versus Time in Thermal-Vacuum 
Tests. 
Figure 5 depicts failures versus time 
information. Failures of prototype and 
flight spacecraft tests are presented 
separately, and in each case, shows the 
influence of the hot and cold environ-
ments. 
DISCUSSION 
Htgh vs Low Temperature Failures: The 
terms "high" and "low" temperatures have 
been used in a general sense. Table 5 
lists the actual temperatures used in 
testing the spacecraft. It shows ~hat 
"high" temperatures ranged from 20 0 C to 
55°C while "low" temperatures ranged from 
OOC to -lSoC. Table 2 shows that the high 
temperature level produced more failures 
on t.he prototype spacecraft than the low 
temperatures. With these failures cor-
rected (and with a slightly lower tempera-
ture level used) the total number of high 
temperature failures on all the flight 
unit spacecraft was reduced to five. This 
was expected and is consistent with the 
philosophy of testing used. 
The data on low temperature tests show 
more failures in flight spacecraft than on 
prototype spacecraft. These results were 
not expected. Examination of the failure 
results indicates approximately 4~1o of 
the failures were repeat failures, i.e. 
the same item had caused a failure before. 
This trend indicates prototype failures 
should be examined carefully for other 
potential failures and a repaired item 
should be completely requalified before 
reentering the system. Another 4~1o, which 
could not be related to previous failures, 
were evident in less than 24 hours of 
testing. The rema~ing 2~1o were new 
type failures and appeared after 2 to 9 
days of exposure to the cold enVironment. 
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Types of failures: Table 3 summarizes 
the types'of failures. Component 
(resistor, capacitor, transistor, etc.) 
failures account for 35% of the total. 
Mechanical, design, and thermal cate-
gories are the other major types of 
failures. This table gives further 
detail on the excessive number of cold 
failures on flight spacecraft. It shows 
65% of these failures were in the compon-
ent and design categories. 
Long term failures: During laboratory 
tests, one prototype spacecraft had 
several problem areas which required re-
tests of the entire spacecraft. The test 
time amounted to 12 days at low tempera-
tures and 10 days at high temperatures. 
This gave an opportunity to disclose 
failures which might occur if testing 
time was increased beyond the present 
8 to 10 days for prototype spacecraft, 
(seven at high temperature and three days 
at low temperature). 
Table 4 shows that 55% of the long term 
failures were repeat failures, i.e., the 
same item had shown trouble previously 
in the test. The results verify the 
need fpr full time testing after repair 
of an item. There is always a tempta-
tion to shorten the time for a retest, 
but the temptation should be resisted. 
The failures listed as new failures 
in Table 3 must be examined carefully. 
These are data which may be helpful in 
affirming or revising the, test duration 
specified for thermal-vacuum tests of 
prototype and flight spacecraft. Two of 
the failures, one at 7 days and one 9 
days, occurred during a cold test on a 
prototype spacecraft. Although listed 
as failures, there was no malfunction or 
loss of data; in each case, it was inter-
ference in the signal output. Another 
failure, after 6 days of operating time, 
occurred in a hO,t test on a prototype 
spacecraft. This failure was important 
since it would have resulted in a 
Satellite failure at the time the re-
cycle timer was required to work. (It 
should be noted, however, that the 
recycle timer does not operate continu-
ously, but only at times that the 
battery supply voltage decreases to a pre-
determined level.. The cause for this 
failure could have been influenced more 
by the number of times the unit was 
actuated, rather than the time Under 
vacuum).' i 
Most of the failures listed in Table 4 
may be analyzed as to importance or 
effect on spacecraft performance. Such 
an analysis shows that no in-line sub-
systems are involved and total spacecraft 
operation is not jeopardized. However, 
it is interesting to note that all of 
the reported long term failures were from 
three models of spacecraft out of a total 
of 10 which Were tested for the three 
'" 
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projects. The test duration for the other " 
spacecraft tested was 3 days or less, at 
the high or the low temperature level. 
It would appear that additional long 
term testing of both prototype and flight 
unit spacecraft is in order to gain'"addi'..: 
tiona 1 data on this subject. 
FLIGHT PERFORMANCE 
Brief commentaries on the flight per-
formance of each of the three spacecraft 
are given below. The scientific findings 
and detailed performance reports are 
covered in other publications. 
The Interplanetary Probe (Explorer x) 
was launched on March 25, 1961. Its trans-
mitters functioned for the expected life 
of the spacecraft (60 hours). One failure 
was encountered. Temperature measurements 
inside the sphere which housed the rubi-
dium vapor magnetometer showed a' continu-
our rise for several hours after satellite 
injection. When the temperature rose 
above 55 0 C after 2 hours, the rubidium 
vapor magnetometer operation became inter-
mittent. Post-flight tests demonstrated ' 
that during launch out-gassing of the hot 
nose cone surface adjacent to the sphere 
co~sed deposition of a film on the sphere 
that greatly increased the absorptivity 
o[ the surface. This caused the tempera-
cure to be higher than predicted. 
The Energetic Particles Satellite (Ex-
plorer XII) was launched from Cape Cana-
veral August IS, 1961. Operation of the 
0atellite ceased abruptly at 1:12 EST on 
:),: .. ~:mber 6, 1961 after 112 days of opera-
~~.:)~.. All experiments functioned perfect-
,~y during its orbital life. The exact 
cause of the failure has not been deter-
mined. 
,":,'ne International Ionosphere Satellite 
(Ariel I) was launched from Cape Canaveral 
on April 26, 1962. The Lyman alpha experi-' 
ment failed on launch. Otherwise, opera-
tion of the spacecraft was perfect until 
July 12, 1962, at which time the system 
began to go into 18 hour periods of under-
voltage. As of December, 1962, Ariel I 
had a total equivalent operating time of 
127 days. ~he spacecraft was continuing 
to send good scientific data approximately 
one third of the time. The intermittent 
operatior. was attributed to degradation of 
the Solar Array and other damage caused by 
,the Enhanced Radiation Belt which resulted 
from the high altitude nuclear detonation 
which occurred on July 9, 1962. 
Failure Rate - Laboratory Test and Flight 
The model curve shown in Figure 1 indi-
cates ~hat the number of failures during 
labora,tory tests should decrease with 
time until we reaGP some random failure 
rate. It postulates also, different 
failure rates for prototype and flight 
uni t spacecraft. It does not deal with' 
the effect Of', temperature level on the 
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failure Fate. 
It is of interest to see how the lab-
oratory test data reported herein com-
pares with the model curve. The data 
did not permit generation of a curve to 
predict the time at which a random fail-
,ure rate is attained. However, the limit-
ed data were used to prepare Figure 5. 
This figure, although restricted to ther-
mal-vacuum tests, can be examined with 
respect to the environmental testing 
part of the model curve. The difference 
in failure rate between the prototype 
and flight units for the high tempera-
ture test is in agreement with that 
postulated by the model curve. The low 
temperature test results (failure rate 
. for prototype versus flight units) are 
not in agreement with those postulated 
from the model curve. , ,P':;".::re 5 also 
presents information ·or, t,;he effect of 
temperature level on,farl'ure rate. The 
figure shows both the high and low 
'temperature tests starting simultaneously 
,at zero time. This is not possible, of 
course, but is presented in this manner 
to have some basis for comparability 
for the three satellites (the satellites 
had different test duration, differe~~ 
amounts of retest, etc.). The results, 
especially for the prototype spacecraft, 
indicate that the two temperature ex-
tremes should be considered as separate 
failure rate curves. 
The curves in Figure 5 may be useful 
in judging the performance of a space-
craft dl,lring thermal-vacuum testing. 
The cuives are considered a best esti-
mate of failures versus time for a 
typical satellite. Performance better 
than the levels shown would be encourag-
ing for predicting successiul space 
performance. Performance w:,rse than 
the levels shown would be r<~ason for 
concern and for extending test time. 
The flight performance 'of the three 
spacecraft has, in general, been quite 
satisfactory. Failures in two of the 
spacecraft (Explorer X and Ariel I), 
were of a type not covered in the thermal-
vacuum tests. The Explorer XII failure, 
after approximately 4 months, may have 
been detected had longer term and more 
severe thermal-va'cuum tests been con-
ducted. 
The l~bor~tory and flight' data pre-
sented are 1nsufficient to form any firm 
test tim~s. However, some useful esti-
mates can be made,' such as: 
Recommended time to test 
prototype spacecraft 
Recommended time to test 
flight unit spacecraft 
(hot) 6 days 
(cold) 4 days 
(hot) 4 days 
(cold) 4 days 
The above estimates discount the failures 
shown at 7-9 days on prototype spacecraft. 
'.. . e" ) i1!;!.r.It....,-;j~~ '.~:~!~'~~'. 
2h~s point r~quires clarification by 
tdditional data. The above bstimates 
.~ompar€:, respectively, with presently 
:hoC:. test duration of 7, 3, 3, and 2 
JdYS. 
l!lMITATIONS OF DATA 
,An important point with respect to 
interpreting the failure data is the 
lack of complete sub-assembly testing, 
and use of unproved components. These 
programs were often forced by firm 
launch dates to use partially proven 
components and/or SUb-systems. Principal 
difficulties in trying to use the labora-
tory failure rate data from system tests 
to predict long term satellite orbital 
performance is that conventional statisti-
cal methods require tests on many samples 
so that distribution curves may be 
generat.ed and used in establishing 
probability levels. At present, there 
are insufficient performance data and 
hence no satisfactory method for deter-
mining conclusive probability figures. 
The data reported herein do not justify, 
.It the present time, the use of an ex-
""nential decrease in failure rate as a 
~~siti for mathematically determining 
a reliability figure with statistical 
confidence. Cooperative effort now 
being applied throughout the space 
industry Will, in time, establish con-
clusive data on.mean time between fail-
ures for components operating in the 
'pace environment. These data, coupled 
~_th failure data from the system tests, 
will permit more accurate prediction of 
the probability of successful perform-
ance of the spacecraft for its specified 
design life. 
The data presented are not sufficient 
in number to indicate more than a trend 
which may be useful in establishing test 
parameters and time durations for the 
conduct of thermal-vacuum testing of 
earth satellites. Also, these data do 
not include any experience in which solar 
simulation tests were conducted. Recog-
nizing these limitations, the following 
points are offered. 
1. 
2. 
The philosophy and test programs 
carried out on three earth satel-
~ites have been helpful in attain-
ing generally successful perform-
ance in space. \ 
The caU$e 0= the premature failure 
(3 to 4 months operation instead 
of one year) of one spacecraft is 
not fully known. 
3~ Although-the data reported'shows 
. some similarity to a model expon-
ential decrease in failure rate 
w~th time under thermal-vacuum 
test, the results are neither 
" 
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consistent nor extensive enough to 
justify using an exponential curve 
as a bas~s ~or computing perform-
ance prob~L:lity. . 
4. SusceptibL.·~ l:y of spacecrafi,: to 
failure fro;n high versus lov': 
temperature environments vat,Les 
between spacecraft, but expc,-ience 
to date indicates additional time 
should be considerec for the low 
temperature environmental pha'se 
of the test. 
5. Duration of pro~otype thermdl-
vacuum tests should be extended. 
to at least 10 days (operating. 
time). Six days at the maximUm 
temperature level and four days 
at the minimum temperature level 
is recommended. 
6. Duration of flight unit thermal-
vacuum tests should be extended 
to at least 8 days. Four days 
at the maximum temperature level 
and four days at the minimum 
temperature is recommended. 
7. The ±lOoC margin used for proto-
type spacecraft ~esting should 
,', 
1- , 
be continued. ' 
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